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GOD’S GREEN EARTH? THE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS OF RELIGIOUS LAND USE
Kellen Zale∗
I. INTRODUCTION
“God 1, County 0”1
Perched between the foothills of the Rockies and the edge of the Great Plains,
Boulder County, Colorado has been at the forefront of the environmental
movement for decades. Starting with its citizens’ vote in 1967 to implement a tax
specifically to preserve open space, the city has long been known for its
progressive environmental policies, ranging from its early implementation of
recycling programs to its “green” building code.2 At the center of Boulder’s
environmental protection efforts is a comprehensive system of land use regulations3
designed to mitigate the slow chokehold of ever-encroaching development on
wetlands and open space, on groundwater and soils, and on wildlife and native
species.4 Numerous communities across the country have followed Boulder’s
much-praised model and enacted their own environmental zoning laws to protect
unique ecosystems and natural resources from the negative effects of land users
who seek to “develop their properties to the limits of the law and sometimes
beyond.”5
Last year, however, the Rocky Mountain Christian Church, a 2000-member
megachurch located in a rural area of Boulder County, persuaded the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals to undermine decades of environmental protection efforts by the
County. In Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Board of Commissioners of
∗ Westerfield Fellow, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law; J.D., Duke University;
A.B., Princeton University. Many thanks to Professor Rob Verchick, John Lovett and Joanne Sweeny
for their helpful advice and feedback; to Mary Owens for her research assistance; and to Loyola
University New Orleans College of Law for its research support.
1. Wayne Laugensen, God 1, County 0, THE CHRISTIAN STANDARD (June 24, 2007),
http://christianstandard.com/2007/06/cs_article-608/.
2. Green Media Kit, BOULDER COLORADO USA, http://www.bouldercoloradousa.com/includes/
content/images/media/docs/Page-Mock-Up---Smart-Growth--FINAL-WEB.pdf (last visited Oct. 5,
2011).
3. See Brief For Petitioner-Appellant at 4-5, Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of County
Comm’r of Boulder County, 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1188) [hereinafter Boulder
Appellate Brief] (describing how the County’s comprehensive plan, which was adopted in the 1970s and
which has been the model for communities throughout the country, seeks to preserve the unique
character of Boulder County, particularly its open space, agricultural lands, and natural resources).
4. CHRISTOPHER DUERKSEN & CARA SNYDER, NATURE-FRIENDLY COMMUNITIES, HABITAT
PROTECTION AND LAND USE 2 (2005).
5. Diana B. Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation As Legal Exemptions Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/08/business/08religious.html?
scp=3&sq=religion. For examples of communities which have enacted environmental zoning laws to
address a wide range of environmental issues, see DUERKSEN & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 210-13, 24044 (discussing zoning regulations in Eugene, Oregon designed to protect wetlands and zoning
regulations in Ft. Collins, Colorado designed to protect open space).
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Boulder County,6 the Tenth Circuit held that Boulder’s zoning laws, limiting
development in environmentally sensitive rural areas, violated the megachurch’s
right to religious exercise under a federal law.
The federal law, known as RLUIPA–the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000–was passed with the intention of protecting
religious land users from discrimination in the zoning process.7 However,
RLUIPA casts a far wider net: the Act allows churches8 to sue local governments
for requiring them to comply with generally applicable zoning laws if they can
show that those laws impose a “substantial burden” on their religious exercise.9 No
evidence, or even allegation, of discrimination is required under RLUIPA.10 As a
result, churches are now exempt from numerous zoning laws, leaving local
governments to struggle with a myriad of unintended consequences.11
RLUIPA has not gone without criticism. Local governments and scholars
alike have argued that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority under the
Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in enacting the Act.12 RLUIPA has also been criticized as a violation
of the Establishment Clause, which requires that the government not prefer one
religion over another, nor prefer religion over irreligion.13 Still others have argued
that RLUIPA is bad public policy because it distorts residential land users’
expectations that their neighborhoods will not be subject to the impacts that non6. Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. (Rocky Mountain
II), 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010), aff’g, (Rocky Mountain I), 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (D. Colo. 2009).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). RLUIPA also contains provisions protecting the religious exercise
of incarcerated persons (i.e., prisoners). § 2000cc-1. This incongruous pairing of zoning laws and
prisoners is the result of Congressional compromises narrowing the scope of RLUIPA from an earlier
law, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which was held unconstitutional in City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). See 146 CONG. REC. S6678, 6687-88 (daily ed. July 13, 2000)
(statements on introduced bills and joint resolutions) (summarizing the history of RLUIPA). See also
infra note 49 for a brief discussion of the history of RLUIPA. This article focuses only on the land use
provisions of the Act.
8. For brevity’s sake, this article uses the term “church” to refer to religious entities of all
denominations, as well as to the structures, including mosques, synagogues, and temples, that a religious
entity uses as the physical place of worship.
9. § 2000cc(a)(1). Once a religious entity shows that a land use law imposes a substantial burden,
the land use law violates RLUIPA unless the local government can show that the land use law is the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Id. See infra Section III for a
more detailed description of RLUIPA’s provisions.
10. § 2000cc(a)(1).
11. For a discussion of RLUIPA’s deleterious impact on non-environmental zoning laws, see
MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VERSUS THE GAVEL, RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 78-110 (Cambridge
University Press ed., 2005).
12. Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Power Over Local Land Use:
Why the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act is Unconstitutional, 2 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV. 366, 426-33 (2009). The prisoner provisions of RLUIPA were held constitutional by the Supreme
Court in 2005; however, the Court specifically stated it was not expressing an opinion on the
constitutionality of the land use provisions. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 n.3 (2005). See
infra Section V and notes 137-38 for a more detailed discussion of arguments regarding RLUIPA’s
constitutionality.
13. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 189-90 (2d. Cir. 2004). Critics
have argued that by providing religious land users with rights available to no other land users, RLUIPA
goes too far in protecting Free Exercise rights. See Hamilton, supra note 12, at 433-35.
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residential uses such as churches create, such as excess traffic and noise.14
This article proposes an additional argument against RLUIPA: that by
allowing religious entities to use their property in ways that no other land users can,
the Act threatens to undermine local environmental protection efforts nationwide.
If Boulder, with its impeccable record of environmental stewardship, could not
survive an attack under RLUIPA,15 the environmental zoning laws of other
communities face an even greater threat. RLUIPA’s message to churches is that
they can expand without regard to the detrimental impact of their development. As
a founding member of Rocky Mountain Christian Church explained when asked if
there could be any limits on the church’s expansion, “There’s God’s limit. When
he says, ‘You’re at your limit,’ that’s when we will stop.”16
“God’s limit,” however, may come too late for the ecosystems and natural
resources that stand in the path of religious development. To those that would
argue that churches should “not be treated the same as a Wal-Mart or a gas
station,”17 this article responds that the environmental impacts to the ecosystem are
exactly the same whether a 200,000-square foot mega-church or a 200,000-square
foot Wal-Mart is built on a parcel of rural open space. The identity of the land user
is irrelevant when measuring negative environmental impacts.
Section II begins with an overview of how religious exercise in the United
States has changed in recent years, bringing it into greater conflict with zoning
laws, including environmental zoning laws. Section III provides a brief overview
of RLUIPA and how courts have interpreted the Act’s provisions. Section IV
reviews the Rocky Mountain case in more detail, discussing both the Tenth Circuit
and federal district court decisions. Section V considers several approaches to
minimizing RLUIPA’s threat to the environment. The article concludes by
suggesting that protecting churches from discrimination should not require
eviscerating environmental protection laws. While courts must take the lead in
narrowly interpreting RLUIPA to avoid unintended consequences on the
environment, the parties—religious entities and local governments—must
recognize their common ground and seek solutions that respect both religion and
the environment.

14. See HAMILTON, supra note 11, at 106-07.
15. Despite a jury finding that Boulder’s zoning laws had not been enacted or applied with any
intent to discriminate against religious land users, the County was still found to have violated RLUIPA’s
other prongs. Rocky Mountain II, 613 F.3d at 1235.
16. Henriques, supra note 5.
17. Peter Applebome, Where Religion Meets Real Estate, a Developer and Town Face Off, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, at 1.29, available at http://select.nytimes.com/2007/01/21/nyregion/
21towns.html?scp=4&sq=RLUIPA. See also Religious Liberty Protect Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R.
1691 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 26
(1999) [hereinafter RLPA Hearings], available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/
judiciary/hju62491.000/hju62491_0f.htm (testimony of Richard Land, President, Ethics and Religious
Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, arguing that “you can’t treat a church or a
mosque or a synagogue the same way you treat a bowling alley or a used car dealership”).
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II. RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND THE ZONING PROCESS
A. Religion’s Place in the American Landscape
Founded by people seeking a place to practice their religion openly and
without fear of persecution, the United States has always been a religious nation.18
Today, eighty-three percent of Americans describe themselves as members of an
organized faith.19 In addition to the First Amendment’s guarantee of free exercise
of religion, numerous other laws—ranging from tax-exempt status for religious
organizations to exemptions from discrimination laws for religious employers20 –
give religious entities a preferential place in the legal system.21
While religion has always loomed large in the political landscape, how
Americans exercise their religion has changed in recent years. Traditionally,
churches were located in residential neighborhoods and catered to local residents
with once-weekly services. However, in the 1980s, a “paradigm shift” occurred22:
activities at churches were no longer limited to once-a-week, as churches became a
“locus for social services, as well as a center for worship and entertainment.”23 Use
of existing facilities became more extensive and intensive, with church activities
ranging from soup kitchens to singles’ meetings to summer camps.24
At the same time that the frequency of activities at existing churches was
expanding, megachurches—defined as Protestant churches with weekly worship
attendance of over 2000 people—were becoming a growing presence in American
suburbs and exurbs.25 In 1970, there were ten megachurches in the United States;
18. C. WELTON GADDY & BARRY W. LYNN, FIRST FREEDOM FIRST, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
PROTECTING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE xxiii-xxiv (Beacon
Press ed., 2008); Deborah M. Rosenthal, Religion and the Constitution, in RLUIPA READER 7, 9-14
(Michael S. Giaimo & Lora A. Lucero eds., 2009).
19. U.S. Religious Landscape Survey Report 1: Religious Affiliation, THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION
& PUBLIC LIFE [hereinafter PEW FORUM], http://religions.pewforum.org/reports (last visited Oct. 5,
2011). The United States is the most religiously diverse nation in the world. GADDY & LYNN, supra
note 18, at xvii.
20. Henriques, supra note 5.
21. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (“We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. . . . When the state encourages religious instruction or
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it
follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs.”) Thus, the U.S. legal system has given
churches special benefits because religion is generally considered a social good. See Angela C.
Carmella, RLUIPA: Linking Religion, Land Use, Ownership and the Common Good, 2 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV. 485, 489-90 (2009) (explaining that courts may look favorably on religious land use because they
“deem[] houses of worship to be in furtherance of the general welfare.”). See also Shelley Ross Saxer,
When Religion Becomes a Nuisance: Balancing Land Use and Religious Freedom When Activities of
Religious Institutions Bring Outsiders into the Neighborhood, 84 KY. L.J. 507, 511 (1996) (arguing that
“religious uses [should] be given great deference when zoning regulations are applied to such uses
because of their contribution to the general welfare of our country.”).
22. HAMILTON, supra note 11, at 79-80.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. SCOTT THUMA & WARREN BIRD, HARTFORD INSTITUTE FOR RELIGION RESEARCH, CHANGES
IN AMERICAN MEGACHURCHES: TRACING EIGHT YEARS OF GROWTH AND INNOVATION IN THE
NATION’S LARGEST-ATTENDANCE CONGREGATIONS 1 (Sept. 12, 2008), available at
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today, there are over 1200.26 Megachurches draw their membership from the larger
region, not the local community, and they need massive amounts of space to house
their parishioners and their vehicles.27 Like corporate campuses, megachurches
may have multiple buildings spread out over fifty to eighty acres, and their
facilities may include everything from movie theaters to baseball fields to hotels.28
As churches’ land uses expanded, they necessarily found themselves more
frequently dealing with local zoning regulations. The next section discusses the
function of zoning laws and how such laws have evolved to encompass the type of
environmental regulations that were struck down in Rocky Mountain I and II.
B. Zoning and the Environment
Zoning laws, first upheld almost a century ago in Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Company as a valid exercise of the police power to protect the public welfare, are
an outgrowth of nuisance law.29 While nuisance law addresses conflicting land
uses after the conflict arises, zoning provides regulations in advance to balance
conflicting interests and minimize the harm any single property owner’s use causes
others.30 Zoning initially accomplished this goal by separating incompatible uses
into stand-alone zones, such as residential, industrial, and commercial.31 Modern
zoning has evolved from its Euclidean origins to encompass wide-ranging planning
objects and address complex land use demands.32 Today, zoning not only regulates
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/Changes%20in%20American%20
Megachurches%20Sept%2012%202008.pdf.
26. Jennifer S. Evans-Cowley & Kenneth Pearlman, Six Flags Over Jesus: RLUIPA, Megachurches,
and Zoning, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 203, 205 (2008). See also THUMA & BIRD, supra note 25, at 1.
27. See Jonathan D. Weiss & Randy Lowell, Supersizing Religion: Megachurches, Sprawl and
Smart Growth, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 313, 317-18 (2002).
28. Evans-Cowley & Pearlman, supra note 26, at 207-08.
29. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a zoning code that established
separate zones for residential, agricultural, industrial, and commercial uses against constitutional
challenge under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Local governments derive their
zoning powers from the police power, which is delegated to them by state enabling acts. See John R.
Nolon & Mary C. Stockel, Expanding Traditional Land Use Authority Through Environmental
Legislation: The Regulation of Affordable Housing, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1988). Courts have
construed the power of localities to enact zoning laws broadly and deferred to local governments’
decisions by applying rational basis review to most challenges to zoning laws. See Young v. Am. Mini
Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S 50, 71 (1976) (holding that a “city’s interest in attempting to preserve the quality
of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect.”); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
481 (2005) (rejecting a takings challenge to a zoning redevelopment scheme: “The concept of the public
welfare is broad and inclusive . . . . The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”)
(quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
30. Hamilton, supra note 12, at 375-78.
31. Id.
32. In Euclid, the Supreme Court recognized that land use laws, by definition, must evolve as
conditions change: “[r]egulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing
conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century
ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.” 272 U.S. at 387. Thus, local
governments developed more sophisticated zoning tools, such as variances and conditional use permits,
which provide flexibility in the zoning process. Hamilton, supra note 12, at 377.
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the structural and architectural components of buildings, but also addresses parking
and traffic issues, affordable housing requirements, and a wide swath of
environmental concerns.33 Echoing the Supreme Court’s Euclid decision,34 a local
government official involved in the Rocky Mountain case explained that Boulder’s
zoning laws are designed to balance conflicting interests: “It’s not that some
development is good and some is bad. What Boulder County has done is to make
sure that the right development is in the right place.”35
Initially, zoning laws that protected the environment did so incidentally. For
example, open space zoning requirements intended to protect property values and
private views also preserved habitat.36 By the 1980s, however, the link between
land use law and environmental law became firmly established,37 and some zoning
laws were implemented with the sole, not incidental, goal of protecting
environmental interests.38 Guided by local concerns, environmental zoning laws
have been “flexibly tailored to local contexts,”39 and have filled in the regulatory
gaps left by federal and state environmental laws to ensure that land users control
use of their property and limit damage to natural resources and ecosystems.40
33. DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR., CURTIN’S CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW 27-46 (17th ed.
1997). As with Euclidean zoning laws, courts typically apply rational basis review to “non-traditional”
zoning laws. Prior to RLUIPA, numerous environmental zoning laws were upheld against challenges by
both religious and non-religious users, on grounds that environmental protection is a legitimate goal of
local government and is permissible under its police power. John R. Nolon, The Law of Sustainable
Development: Keeping Pace, 30 PACE L. REV. 1246, 1281-84 (2010) (describing cases where such
challenges were dismissed by courts applying rational basis review). But see Nolon & Stockel, supra
note 29, at 6 (noting that the Supreme Court’s increasingly active stance regarding takings has had the
effect of limiting local government’s ability to enact a wide variety of zoning laws).
34. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388 (“A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a
pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”).
35. Dwight H. Merriam, RLUPIA: Two Sides of the Story, SN005 ALI-ABA 1149 (2007).
36. John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 374 (2002).
37. Some states have explicitly incorporated the requirements of their state environmental laws into
the local zoning process. See Kathryn C. Plunkett, Comment, Local Environmental Impact Review:
Integrating Land Use and Environmental Planning Through Local Environmental Impact Reviews, 20
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 215 (2003) (noting that New York, California, and Washington encourage
local governments to implement their state environmental law requirements into the local planning
process). For example, in California, the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) requires that
any governmental action involving the approval of a project identify significant environmental effects
and mitigate those effects. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 2010). Rather than require a land use
applicant to go through two approval processes—first to satisfy a local zoning code and second to
satisfy CEQA—California law requires that municipalities incorporate CEQA into their land use
approval process. Id. § 21003(a). See also MICHAEL H. REMY ET AL., GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT (11th ed. 2006).
38. See, e.g., Nolon, supra note 33, at 1280; Nolon, supra note 36, at 372-77.
39. Nolon, supra note 36, at 411.
40. While a multitude of federal laws protect the air and water, protection of the land has been
called the “weakest link in modern environmental law.” A. Dan Tarlock, Land Use Regulation: The
Weak Link in Environmental Protection, 82 WASH. L. REV. 651, 652 (2007). There is no equivalent to
the Clean Water Act or Clean Air Act for land, and federal regulations have proven inadequate at
addressing the incremental threat of sprawl and development to “non-wild” lands. Id. at 657-58. One
reason federal regulation has failed to protect the land is because “too many species’ and places’ appeal
are not special enough to our national political” agencies. Jamison E. Colburn, Localism’s Ecology:
Protecting and Restoring Habitat in the Suburban Nation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 945, 949 (2006). Land use
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The types of local environmental laws that exist today are as diverse as the
types of landscapes in the United States.41 Regulations range from erosion control
measures and riparian setbacks to storm water management protocols and tree
mitigation requirements.42 In recognition of the ecological value of undeveloped or
minimally developed land, many communities have also established open space or
rural zoning designations limiting the scale of development on such land.43 These
types of zoning laws and others play a key role in protecting the environment and
resisting the “death by a thousand cuts” threatened by ever-expanding
development.44
III. RLUIPA’S LAND USE PROVISIONS
While all land users must comply with zoning regulations, environmental or
otherwise, as religious entities faced increasingly complicated land use regulatory
regimes, they began to perceive zoning laws as interfering with their “higher
purpose.”45 In addition, in rare cases, zoning laws were inappropriately used to
covertly discriminate against religious entities.46 Thus, in the 1990s, churches
lobbied Congress for a law to insulate them from the zoning process.47 A testament
to the perseverance of the religious lobby,48 RLUIPA emerged after a decade-long
contest between Congress and the Supreme Court about the scope of constitutional
protection for religious exercise.49
law, however, is uniquely suited to protecting the places that may not register as “special” on the
national level. In addition, because of resistance to federal, or even state or regional, management of
local matters, local zoning laws are often the only legal protection for much of the land in the United
States. See DUERKSEN & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 4-6.
41. See DUERKSEN & SNYDER, supra note 4 (providing several in-depth case studies of local
communities’ uses of environmental zoning laws); Nolon, supra note 33, at 1280 (describing in detail
several types of environmental zoning laws).
42. Nolon, supra note 36, at 376.
43. Similarly, numerous communities have recognized the value of agricultural land, and zoning
laws have been used to preserve and protect such lands from non-farm land uses. See DUERKSEN &
SNYDER, supra note 4, at 174-78 (describing such efforts in Dane County, Wisconsin).
44. Henriques, supra note 5.
45. See HAMILTON, supra note 11, at 91.
46. See Islamic Cntr. of Miss. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that the city had discriminated against a mosque when the mosque was denied a building permit, while
every other religious institution that had ever applied for such a permit had been granted one; therefore,
even under rational basis review, the city’s zoning laws were an unconstitutional violation of equal
protection and due process).
47. See Bradley P. Jacob, Free Exercise in the “Lobbying Nineties,” 84 NEB. L. REV. 795, 816-17
(2006) (describing the coalition of religious groups that joined together to seek legislative protection for
expansive free exercise rights).
48. See id. RLUIPA was one of several laws protective of religion that emerged in the 1990s; these
laws have been referred to as “a sort of religious affirmative action program.” See Henriques, supra
note 5.
49. A complete history of RLUIPA is beyond the scope of this article, but the topic has been
extensively analyzed by other commentators. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis
of RLUIPA and Federalism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and its Impact on
Local Government, 40 URB. LAW. 195 (2008); Marci A. Hamilton, The History of RLUIPA, in RLUIPA
READER 31, 31-40 (Michael S. Giaimo & Lora A. Lucero eds., 2009); Daniel P. Lennington, Thou Shall
Not Zone: The Overboard Applications and Troublesome Implications of RLUIPA’s Land Use
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RLUIPA upends the traditional deference given to zoning laws as a valid
exercise of the police power to protect the public welfare.50 Because Congress
believed religious discrimination could be masked behind pretextual reasons such
as traffic or noise,51 RLUIPA requires courts to apply a strict scrutiny or strict
liability standard to any land use regulation affecting a church.52 RLUIPA provides
religious land users with three distinct ways to challenge generally applicable
zoning laws. First, a land use regulation violates RLUIPA if it substantially
burdens religious exercise and it is not the least restricting means of furthering a
compelling interest.53 Second, a land use regulation cannot be imposed in a
manner that treats a religious assembly “on less than equal terms than a
nonreligious assembly or institution.”54 Third, a land use regulation violates
RLUIPA if it unreasonably limits, completely excludes, or discriminates against
religious assemblies.55
Provisions, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805 (2005-2006); Caroline R. Adams, The Constitutional Validity of
the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Will RLUIPA’s Strict Scrutiny Survive
the Supreme Court’s Strict Scrutiny?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2361 (2002). The road to RLUIPA began
with the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which held that rational basis
review applied to generally applicable laws that did not single out individuals because of their religious
beliefs, even if the law incidentally burdened some religious exercise. Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res.
of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Viewing Smith as eviscerating protection for religious exercise,
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) in 1993, a sweeping law that applied
strict scrutiny to all laws that burdened religious exercise. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)). In 1997, the Supreme
Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states: “RFRA is so out of proportion to a
supposed remedial or preventative object that . . . [i]t appears . . . to attempt a substantive change in
constitutional protections.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997). After several other
revisions of RFRA died in Congressional committees, RLUIPA, with its odd pairing of land use and
prisoners, was passed in the Senate by unanimous roll call vote and signed into law by President Clinton
in 2000. HAMILTON, supra note 11, at 39.
50. Prior to RLUIPA, zoning challenges by churches were reviewed under deferential rational basis
review; most zoning laws were not considered a violation of religious freedom, even where they
prevented a church from worshipping at a “preferred” location. See, e.g., Am. Commc’n Ass’n, C.I.O.
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397-98 (1950) (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Porterville, 338 U.S. 805 (1949) (describing how the Supreme Court
“dismissed for want of substantiality an appeal in which a church group contended that its First
Amendment rights were violated by a municipal zoning ordinance preventing the building of churches
in residential areas.”)).
51. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) [hereinafter Joint Statement], (joint
statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, explaining that the Act was intended to
address the “nationwide problem” of discrimination against churches in the zoning process).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006).
53. Id. The substantial burden prong is only applicable if (i) the burden is “imposed in a program or
activity that receives Federal financial assistance,” (ii) the burden affects interstate commerce, or (iii) in
the implementation of a land use system involving “individualized assessments of the proposed uses for
the property involved.” § 2000cc(a)(2). These three “jurisdictional hooks” correspond to the three
Constitutional bases for Congress’s enactment of RLUIPA: the Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause,
and Section 5 of the 14th Amendment.
54. § 2000cc(b)(1).
55. § 2000cc(b)(2-3). RLUIPA lawsuits often include a claim under the non-discrimination prong,
but courts typically decide RLUIPA cases under either the substantial burden or equal terms prongs.
Evidence of religious antipathy may figure in decisions finding a violation under these other prongs, but
few cases have been decided solely under the non-discrimination prong. See, e.g., Guru Nanak Sikh
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“Land use regulation” is defined broadly as any “zoning or landmarking law,
or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or
development of land.”56 Standing under RLUIPA is restricted to parties who have
traditional property interests in the land: claimants must have an “ownership,
leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land or a
contract or option to acquire such an interest.”57
RLUIPA has proven to be a significant challenge to local governments not
because they are trying to covertly discriminate against religious entities, but
because RLUIPA makes unlawful a wide array of government actions where there
is no evidence, or even allegation, of discrimination.58 Two separate but related
factors have further complicated matters for local governments. First, RLUIPA
allows churches to claim virtually anything as part of its “religious exercise,” and
courts cannot question the claimed belief.59 Second, courts have applied
inconsistent standards to the substantial burden and equal terms prongs of
RLUIPA, providing no clear rule as to what will be considered a violation of
RLUIPA. 60
A. Religious Exercise under RLUIPA
“Religious exercise” is defined broadly under RLUIPA as “any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,”
including the “use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of
religious exercise.”61
When read in conjunction with First Amendment
jurisprudence prohibiting courts from questioning the validity or centrality of
alleged religious beliefs,62 this expansive definition allows churches to claim
Soc’y. of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing evidence of
discriminatory behavior by a local government against a Hindu Temple, but finding that the substantial
burden prong, not the discrimination prong, of RLUIPA had been violated by the local government).
56. § 2000cc-5(5).
57. Id. Thus, a synagogue was found to not have standing under RLUIPA when it claimed that its
religious exercise had been detrimentally affected by a land use regulation requiring a cellular tower to
be built on neighboring property because the synagogue had no property interest in the neighboring
property. Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 202 F.R.D. 402, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
rev’d on other grounds, 430 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2005).
58. When Congress acts under its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 remedial power, as it did in
enacting RLUIPA, it “may prohibit ‘a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not
itself forbidden by the [Constitution].” Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003)
(citations omitted). However, there must be “a significant likelihood” of the prohibited conduct being
unconstitutional as well as congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved.” City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530, 532 (1997). Generally applicable zoning laws prohibited by
RLUIPA are rarely found to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City
of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a zoning ordinance violated the equal terms
prong of RLUIPA, but did not violate the First Amendment); Rocky Mountain I, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163,
1167 (D. Colo. 2009) (noting that while the jury found that Boulder’s zoning law was prohibited under
RLUIPA, it found that the zoning law was not a constitutional violation). Thus, the question of whether
RLUIPA’s land use provisions are unconstitutional remains an open question.
59. See infra Section III(A) and notes 63-67.
60. See infra Section III(B)(1) and notes 68-78.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7) (2006).
62. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the judicial ken to
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’
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virtually anything as part of its “religious exercise.”63 Thus, churches have an
incentive to define their religious belief as precisely the thing they are prevented
from doing by a zoning law. For example, a church in Maryland alleged that
erecting an oversized electronic billboard to advertise its services was part of its
religious exercise and that a zoning regulation limiting the size of such billboards
was a violation of RLUIPA.64
Even where courts may be dubious about the “religious” nature of a particular
belief, they must accept the belief as part of the claimant’s religious exercise as
long as it is sincerely held.65 For example, the Church of Universal Love and
Music in Pennsylvania alleged that holding outdoor rock concerts was part of its
religious exercise and a zoning law prohibiting such activity in a residential
neighborhood was a violation of RLUIPA.66 Because the court could not question

interpretations of those creeds.”) (citations omitted). However, courts have not been hesitant to question
a faith’s “religious belief” when the religion in question is a Native American religion. See, e.g., Navajo
Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (2008) (rejecting a RFRA claim by a Navajo religious group
against the federal government for allowing a ski resort on federally-owned land considered sacred in
the Navajo religion and questioning whether the church’s belief that the mountain was sacred was a
“core belief”). A key underlying distinction between Navajo Nation and most RLUIPA cases is that the
religious entity in Navajo Nation had no property interest in the subject land. See id. at 1064. As noted
above, RLUPA requires that a religious entity must have a property interest in the land at issue. §
2000cc-5(5). It is ironic that RFRA failed to protect Native American religious beliefs, considering that
it was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which
centered on Native American religious beliefs. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 512-17 (describing how the
Smith decision led to the enactment of RFRA).
63. Congress conceded that “not every activity carried out by a religious entity or individual
constitutes ‘religious exercise.’” Joint Statement, supra note 51, at 7776. For example, if a church
owns a commercial office building and rents from the building provide the funding for the church’s
religious activities, the commercial office building is not automatically considered religious exercises
(but it also is not automatically not considered religious exercise). Id. See also Greater Bible Way
Temple v. City of Jackson, 733 N.W.2d 734, 745-46 (Mich. 2007) (holding that a church’s operation of
an apartment building was not a religious exercise, and thus RLUIPA was not applicable). However,
churches have claimed a wide variety of activities other than worship activities as religious exercise
protected under RLUIPA, including schools, hospitals, and day care centers. Hamilton, supra note 12,
at 412-14.
64. Trinity Assembly of God v. People’s Counsel, 962 A.2d 404, 427 (Md. 2008) (“[A]ssum[ing],
without deciding, that Trinity’s use of the sign it proposed would constitute religious exercise as defined
by RLUIPA.”). The court in Trinity Assembly ultimately rejected the church’s argument that a
substantial burden had been imposed:
Trinity argues that the sign it wants constitutes religious exercise; that the Board will not
let it have the sign it wants; and, thus, the Board’s refusal substantially burdens Trinity’s
religious exercise. This rote application of the RLUIPA does not persuade us because it
renders the “substantial burden” element largely nugatory; it suggests that a restriction on
land use qualifies as a “substantial burden,” even if it actually poses only a slight
impediment to religious exercise.
Id. at 429.
65. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971) (citations and quotations omitted) (“The
‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question’; rather the question is whether the objector’s beliefs are truly
held.”). See also Salkin & Lavine, supra note 49, at 222.
66. Church of Universal Love & Music v. Fayette Cnty., No. 06-872, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65564, at *17 (W.D. Penn. August, 26, 2008) (making “no determination whether or not Plaintiffs’
belief or practice in question (i.e., holding music events) is compelled by, or central to, their system of
religious beliefs” but only considering the “sincerity” of the beliefs).
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whether holding rock concerts is a religious belief, the church was found to have
stated a claim under RLUIPA sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion by
the local government.67
B. Inconsistent Standards under RLUIPA’s Substantial Burden and Equal Terms
Prongs
1. Substantial Burden
RLUIPA’s substantial burden prong is based on the constitutional strict
scrutiny test, the most stringent standard in constitutional law.68 Any land use
regulation that creates a substantial burden on religious exercise is unlawful unless
it is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.69
The burden is on a religious claimant to establish that a substantial burden has been
imposed; once a claimant does so, the burden shifts to the government to prove that
the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest.70
RLUIPA does not define “substantial burden,” and in the decade since the
Act’s passage, the precise meaning of the term remains unclear. The issue has yet
to reach the Supreme Court, and appellate court definitions vary widely.71 Even
definitions from the same circuit court are inconsistent. For example, the Seventh
Circuit has held that to be a substantial burden, a land use law must bear “direct,
primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise . . .
effectively impracticable.”72 Yet, in another case, the Seventh Circuit found a
substantial burden where a zoning law would have done nothing more than subject
the church to “unreasonable delay” or having to “find a suitable alternative
parcel.”73
While courts generally agree that the imposition of fees applicable to all
zoning applicants is not a substantial burden, there is little agreement beyond that

67. Id. at *16, *20.
68. See Joint Statement, supra note 51, at 7776 (“[I]t is not the intent of this Act to create a new
standard for the definition of “substantial burden” on religious exercise. Instead, that term as used in the
Act should be interpreted by reference to Supreme Court jurisprudence.”).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006).
70. Id. Some states have passed religious land use laws that constrain local governments even more
than RLUIPA does. For example, in 2010, Arizona passed the “Free Exercise of Religion Law,” which
provides that the government cannot impose a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial
burden regardless of whether there is a compelling interest. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.03
(2007).
71. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 49, at 259-67 (describing the various definitions of substantial
burden in all of the federal appellate courts and selected state courts).
72. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi. (CLUB), 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003).
73. Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895,
900-01 (7th Cir. 2005). The Seventh Circuit subsequently seemed to return to its CLUB definition in
later cases and explained that its holding in New Berlin was based on the fact that the zoning denial in
that case was “so utterly groundless as to create an inference of religious discrimination,” and therefore
could have been decided under the unequal terms prong rather than the substantial burden prong. Petra
Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2007). See also Vision Church
v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d. 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing CLUB, not New Berlin, for the
definition of “substantial burden”).
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baseline.74 Some courts have held that zoning laws limiting a church’s expansion
are a substantial burden, even if the church can still conduct religious activity at its
current location.75 In contrast, other courts have held that even if a zoning law has
the effect of completely prohibiting a church’s worship activities on a particular
parcel of land, no substantial burden exists.76 While several courts have held that a
zoning regulation that causes logistical difficulties or impositions on non-worship
activities can be a substantial burden,77 other courts have held that inconveniences
resulting from a zoning regulation’s application are not a substantial burden under
RLUIPA as long as they do not force worshippers “to forego the tenets of” their
religion.78
The “least restrictive means” of furthering a “compelling government interest”
provision of the substantial burden prong have not been analyzed extensively in the
case law, in part because when a claimant fails to establish a substantial burden,
courts can end their inquiry under RLUIPA.79 Under the constitutional strict
scrutiny test RLUIPA is based on, few interests qualify as compelling; even

74. Congress specifically provided that RLUIPA does not “relieve religious institutions from
applying for variances, special permits or exceptions, hardship approval, or other relief provisions in
land use regulations, where available without discrimination or unfair delay.” Joint Statement, supra
note 51, at 7776. Courts have therefore held that application costs or fees, even if expensive, are not a
substantial burden. See, e.g., San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 103536 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the requirement to submit a complete application, including
environmental impact studies costing several thousand dollars, applies to all applicants and therefore is
not a substantial burden). The San Jose court explained that application requirements cannot impose “a
significantly great restriction” on religious exercise, only a denial of a complete application could do
so.) Id. at 1035. See also CLUB, 342 F.3d at 762 (“[N]o . . . free pass for religious land uses
masquerades among the legitimate protections RLUIPA affords to religious exercise.”).
75. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 122627 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Rocky Mountain I, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1170 (D. Colo. 2009). See infra Section
IV for a detailed discussion of the district court decision in Rocky Mountain and infra Section V for a
detailed discussion of how decisions like Cottonwood Christian and Rocky Mountain I create a slippery
slope by holding that zoning laws limiting expansion are substantial burdens.
76. See, e.g., Timberline Baptist Church v. Washington Cnty., 154 P.3d. 759, 774 (Or. Ct. App.
2007). See infra Section V for a detailed discussion of Timberline.
77. See, e.g., Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 424 F. Supp. 2d 309, 311, 312, 322 (D. Mass. 2006)
(summarily concluding that the lack of meeting space for church committees and crowding in the
rectory building—not the church itself—constituted a substantial burden).
78. See, e.g., Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 406 F. Supp. 2d 507,
515 (D. N.J. 2005) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)) (holding that a “mere
inconvenience is not enough to meet the ‘substantial burden’ requirement, nor is it a substantial burden
when a law merely ‘operates so as to make the practice of religious beliefs more expensive’”) aff’d in
part and rev’d in part by 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007). See also Williams Island Synagogue, Inc. v. City
of Aventura, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215-16 (S.D.Fla. 2005) (holding that the inconveniences faced by a
synagogue in its current location—late-arriving women having to walk to the male prayer area,
congregants having to rotate their bodies to face the proper direction for prayer, and meals being
prepared in the back of the prayer area because there was no kitchen—were not actionable under
RLUIPA).
79. See, e.g., Trinity Assembly of God v. People’s Counsel, 962 A.2d 404, 432 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2008) (concluding that the zoning ordinance did not impose a substantial burden and therefore
determining that the court “need not decide whether the Sign Law and the Board’s denial of the
variances are the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling government interest.”).
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significant or important government interests will not suffice.80 Thus, courts
considering RLUIPA challenges have held that government interests in traffic
safety,81 aesthetics,82 blight avoidance,83 and tax revenues84 are not compelling,
even if they are significant. However, some courts have framed the government
interest more broadly—as an interest in enforcing land use laws to preserve public
health, welfare, and safety—and have found such an interest to be compelling.85
The determination of whether a government regulation is the least restrictive
means of achieving a compelling interest is fact-specific and no general trends
emerge from the case law. The few courts that have reached the question have
usually done so unnecessarily, in dicta, after they have already held that there is no
substantial burden or no compelling interest.86
2. Equal Terms
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision provides that “[n]o government shall impose
or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or
institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”87
The plain language of the statute does not require that the religious assembly be
similar to the non-religious assembly in any way. Thus, as written, RLUIPA
implies that local governments are strictly liable if a RLUIPA plaintiff can
“identify any nonreligious assembly or institution that enjoys better terms under the
land-use regulation.”88 Since this interpretation would produce absurd89 and

80. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“[O]nly those interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”).
81. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
82. See id. at 553-54 (holding that regulating visual impact of land uses was not a compelling
governmental interest and citing other decisions reaching the same conclusion as to aesthetics).
83. See Cottonwood Christian Ctr., 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1228. But see Lighthouse Inst. for
Evangelism, Inc.v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding, in dicta, that
redevelopment and economic revitalization are compelling interests).
84. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.
85. See Greater Bible Way of Jackson v. City of Jackson, 733 N.W.2d 734, 751-52 (Mich. 2007)
(holding that a government’s interest in enacting and enforcing zoning regulations is a compelling
interest and describing several other cases that have also held so). But see Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill.
of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353(2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a general interest in enforcing zoning
regulations is not compelling; rather a local government “must show a compelling interest in imposing
the burden on religious exercise in the particular case at hand”).
86. See, e.g., Greater Bible Way of Jackson, 733 N.W.2d at 750-54 (holding that no substantial
burden was imposed by the challenged zoning regulation, but then going on to find that even if a
substantial burden had been imposed, it was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
government interest).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006).
88. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 264. For example, if a local government
granted the variance application of a small private school to provide a few less parking spots than
required by the zoning code, it must also grant a variance application of a megachurch to provide
hundreds of fewer parking spots than required by the zoning code. See id.
89. See id. at 268 (explaining that a provision that makes the government strictly liable if there is
any nonreligious assembly, no matter how dissimilarly situated, treated better than a religious entity
would “force local governments to give any and all religious entities a free pass to locate wherever any
secular institution or assembly is allowed.”).
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arguably unconstitutional90 results, four of the five appellate courts addressing the
issue have held that the equal terms provisions require that churches not be treated
on less than equal terms than a similarly situated nonreligious assembly or
institution.91
Courts differ in how they determine whether religious and non-religious
assemblies are similarly situated. For example, the Third Circuit considers whether
the religious and non-religious assemblies are similarly situated with regard to the
purpose of a challenged regulation,92 while the Seventh Circuit considers whether
the two entities are similarly situated with regard to a challenged regulation’s stated
criteria.93 Other circuits have not specifically articulated what it means to be
“similarly situated,” but consider whether there is a non-religious entity that is
similar in some physical respects to the religious entity and that has been treated
differently under the challenged zoning law.94 For example, in Third Church of
Christ v. City of New York, the Second Circuit compared a church on Park Avenue
in New York City to a nearby hotel and held that the church had been treated on
less than equal terms;95 the court reasoned that both the church and the hotel were
located in the same zone and both were being used for catering events in violation
of the zoning code, but only the church had been served with a cease and desist
order.96

90. The Supreme Court Free Exercise and Equal Protection jurisprudence, on which the equal terms
prong is based, compares how a challenged regulation treats religious conduct versus how it treats
“analogous secular conduct that has a similar impact on the regulation’s aims.” Id. at 266. Thus, in
reading a similarly situated requirement onto RLUIPA, courts have followed the canon of construction
that permits narrowing the interpretation of a statute to preserve its constitutionality; without such a
requirement, RLUIPA would be an unconstitutional application of strict liability. Id. at 266-67 & n.11.
But see Sarah Keeton Campbell, Note, Restoring RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 58 DUKE L.J. 1071,
1094 (2009) (arguing that courts’ interpretation of the equal terms prong and imposition of the similarly
situated requirement “contradict[s] . . . Congress’s intent to expand protections for religious liberty”).
91. See Third Church of Christ, Scientist v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 2010);
Rocky Mountain II, 613 F.3d 1229, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2010); River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill.
of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 2010); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at
266. The Eleventh Circuit has not read a similarly situated requirement into RLUIPA’s equal terms
prong. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230-31 (11th Cir. 2004)
(holding that any “differential treatment” between a religious assembly and a secular assembly violates
the equal terms provision, unless the challenged regulation satisfied strict scrutiny); Konikov v. Orange
Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2005) (“For purposes of a RLUIPA equal terms challenge, the
standard for determining whether it is proper to compare a religious group to a nonreligious group is not
whether one is ‘similarly situated’ to the other, as in our familiar equal protection jurisprudence.”).
92. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc., 510 F.3d at 266-67.
93. River of Life Kingdom Ministries, 611 F.3d at 371. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that focusing
on the regulation’s stated criteria is preferable to focusing on its purpose because it provides a court with
objective factors to determine if the two entities are similarly situated. Id. The Seventh Circuit
expressed concern that focusing on the regulations purpose might allow local governments to develop a
justification after the fact to cover up improper unequal treatment. See id.
94. See infra Section IV for discussion of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Rocky Mountain II
regarding the equal terms prong of RLUIPA.
95. Third Church of Christ, Scientist, 626 F.3d at 671-72.
96. Id. at 672.
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IV. RLUIPA’S THREAT TO ENVIRONMENTAL ZONING LAWS
A. RLUIPA and Environmental Zoning Laws
RLUIPA allows churches to do what no other land users are permitted to do:
develop their property in ways that land use laws forbid. When the land use law at
issue is an environmental zoning law, the threat is particularly severe. The
negative environmental impacts of any one particular land use can threaten an
entire ecosystem. The efficacy of environmental zoning regulations often depends
on the area as a whole being protected from the effects of development; just one
overly-intensive development, such as a shopping center or a school or a church, in
an otherwise undeveloped or agricultural area, starts the inevitable buildup that
follows. No matter that other land users are prohibited from building in wetlands
by a zoning restriction, if a church can successfully argue that the zoning restriction
violates RLUIPA, the damage to the environment is done.
Until recently, laws enacted for the protection of the environment largely
escaped challenge under RLUIPA. In part, this is because environmental
protection has traditionally been accomplished through federal and state laws;97
RLUIPA only applies to “zoning or landmarking” laws, which are typically local
laws.98 However, as discussed above in Section II, local land use laws are
increasingly being used to accomplish a wide range of environmental objectives.
When RLUIPA is used to invalidate these laws, incremental environmental
destruction follows.99
The Rocky Mountain decisions foreshadow how RLUIPA could lead to a
“death by a thousand cuts” for environmental protection efforts across the nation.
Rocky Mountain is one of only a handful of cases challenging environmental
zoning laws to have made its way through the court system. Yet considering how
effective RLUIPA has been in allowing religious entities to challenge other types
of land use laws,100 the threat to environmental zoning laws is real. Churches
97. Nolon, supra note 36, at 365.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (2006). However, at least one RLUIPA lawsuit has been filed by a
church alleging that a state environmental law violated its rights under RLUIPA. See Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pompton Plains Reform Bible Church v. Jackson, No. 07-cv-02702,
2007 WL 2605323 (D.N.J. June 11, 2007), (filing suit against the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, and alleging that New Jersey’s state-wide water protection law violated
RLUIPA). The case did not go to trial and the settlement documents are not public.
99. See supra Section II.B.
100. See supra Section III. See also Note, Religious Land Use in the Federal Courts under RLUIPA,
120 HARV. L. REV. 2178, 2179 (2007) (reviewing religious land use cases in the federal appellate courts
since 1980 and concluding the RLUIPA has succeeded in “not only restor[ing] the right to religious
exemptions from land use laws to its pre-Smith status, but also broaden[ing] this right considerably.”).
The author’s own research confirms this finding, and she disagrees with other commentators who argue
that RLUIPA is an ineffective tool or that it has not given churches any advantages in the zoning
process. See Tyler F. Mark, Rocky Mountain Shootout: Free Exercise & Preserving the Open Range, 98
GEO. L.J. 1859, 1887 (2010) (arguing that “concerns about RLUIPA’s effect on local land use
conservation are overhyped.”); Bram Alden, Comment, Reconsidering RLUIPA: Do Religious Land Use
Protections Really Benefit Religious Land Users?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1779, 1779 (2010) (arguing that
RLUIPA has “failed to benefit religious groups and has, in many cases, actually worked a detriment to
these groups.”). A review of RLUIPA land use cases that resulted in a decision on the merits at the
federal appellate level reveals that, as of February 2011, churches prevailed in 11 of the 26 cases, an
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typically occupy between 1-3% of land in U.S. cities,101 and as the highly religious
U.S. population—83% of Americans are affiliated with an organized faith102–
grows from its current total of 310 million to over 390 million by 2050, the amount
of land used by religious entities will only continue to increase.103
B. The Rocky Mountain Case
The plaintiff in Rocky Mountain, Rocky Mountain Christian Church
(“RMCC”), operated a megachurch with an average weekly attendance of 2300
worshippers on a rural property in Boulder County, Colorado.104 The property was
located in an Agricultural District, a zone where all facilities with occupancy loads
over 100 persons are required to apply for special use permits for any changes in
use.105
As RMCC’s membership expanded, its facilities became overcrowded. In
2004, it applied for a special use permit to more than double the size of its
facilities, from 116,000 to 240,000 square feet.106 The County denied RMCC’s
application on the ground that the church’s proposal conflicted with special use
criteria limiting the scope of development in the zone where the church was
located.107 Specifically, RMCC’s proposed expansion would be incompatible with
the surrounding agricultural area and would be an over-intensive use of land,
resulting in depletion of natural resources.108
RMCC sued the County under RLUIPA, alleging that the denial violated the
substantial burden, unequal treatment, unreasonable limitations, and discrimination
prongs of the Act.109 The case first went to a jury, which found that the church had
not been discriminated against by Boulder.110 Nonetheless, the jury found for the

almost fifty percent success rate. Churches have also succeeded under RLUIPA at higher rates at the
trial court level, and have achieved an unknown level of success in reaching favorable settlements by
simply threatening a RLUIPA suit. HAMILTON, supra note 11, at 96-98.
101. No nationwide study exists on how much land is occupied by religious land uses; the 1-3%
figure is based on the Author’s research of individual city records categorizing land use. Many cities do
track what percentage of land is used by institutional or semi-public uses, which typically includes
churches. See, e.g., CITY OF NEWARK, LAND USE ELEMENT OF THE MASTER PLAN FOR THE CITY OF
NEWARK 56 (2004), available at http://www.ci.newark.nj.us/government/city_departments/
economic__housing_development/newarks_master_plan.php (indicating that 2% of parcels in Newark,
New Jersey are occupied by charitable/non-profit uses, not including religious schools). Some
communities track religious land use specifically. See, e.g., Existing Land Use, CITY OF PITTSBURG,
KANSAS, http://www3.pittks.org/index.php?pageid=303 (last visited Dec. 21, 2011) (indicating that 2%
of downtown buildings in Pittsburg, Kansas are occupied by churches). In addition, megachurch
campuses are typically between 50 and 80 acres, and these churches are a growing presence in
American suburbs. See supra Section II.
102. PEW FORUM, supra note 19.
103. National Population Projections, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/
www/pop-profile/natproj.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
104. Rocky Mountain I, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1168 (D. Colo. 2009).
105. Rocky Mountain II, 613 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2010).
106. Id. at 1234.
107. Rocky Mountain I, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1168-69.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1167.
110. Id.
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church on the other three claims under RLUIPA, finding that the zoning law was an
unreasonable limitation and a substantial burden, and that the County had treated
the church on less than equal terms.111
On Boulder’s post-trial motion to vacate the verdict, the district court held that
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings on all three prongs.112
First, the district court held that Boulder’s zoning laws substantially burdened
RMCC’s religious exercise because the regulations limited the megachurch’s
ability to expand.113 Holding that “the denial of a church’s expansion proposal can
constitute a substantial burden even if religious activity continues at the site,” the
district court did not consider the alternatives available to RMCC to accommodate
its growing membership, such as purchasing property in an area where zoning laws
would not prohibit its desired expansion.114 Instead, the district court focused on
the difficulties that RMCC would face in its current location if Boulder’s zoning
regulation were applied.115 Such difficulties included the fact that parishioners at
some services could not witness baptisms; enrollment in some adult Sunday school
classes would be capped; weekly sermons would be shortened from 35 to 25
minutes; and some children’s Sunday school classes would be held in the
hallway.116 Without articulating a specific definition of substantial burden, the
district court held that these and other logistical difficulties were sufficient to show
a substantial burden.117
After finding that a substantial burden had been imposed, the district court
went on to reject Boulder’s environmental protection goals as a compelling state
interest.118 Specifically, the court concluded that the County’s reasons for denying
the church’s permit—over-intensive use of rural land and excessive depletion of
natural resources—were not compelling interests.119 The court offered as an
additional justification for this holding the fact that nine years earlier the County
had allowed a private school located in the same zone as RMCC to expand.120 The
court reasoned that if Boulder were truly concerned about over-intensive use of
rural land and excessive depletion of natural resources, it should have also denied
the private school’s permit a decade earlier.121
The district court also found that RMCC had been treated on less than equal
terms than the private school, which it found to be a similarly situated non-religious

111. Id.
112. Id. at 1177.
113. Id. at 1170-72.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1172.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1172-73.
118. Id. at 1173-76.
119. Id. at 1175.
120. Id.
121. Id. The court then concluded, without discussion, that Boulder had also failed to implement the
least restrictive means of serving its asserted interests. Id. at 1176. The court disregarded evidence that
Boulder had approved of every expansion permit lodged by RMCC between 1986 and 2004 (when the
permit subject of the lawsuit was denied), and the fact that Boulder had approved selected portions of
the 2004 permit application. Id. Boulder Appellate Brief, supra note 3, at 11-14.
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assembly.122 The court found that the church and school were similarly situated
because they were located in the same agricultural zone and thus subject to the
same zoning restrictions, and because the school had sought a similarly large
expansion of its facilities.123 The court found that differences between the church
and the school—the fact that the church applied for a permit nine years after the
school had, as well as the fact that the church would generate ten times more traffic
than the school—were immaterial for purposes of determining whether the two
entities were similarly situated.124
Finally, the district court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury’s finding that Boulder’s zoning laws were an unreasonable limitation on
religious exercise.125 The court cited the trial testimony of one witness, a land use
consultant for Colorado churches, who opined that churches of “any size” in
Boulder County were required to undergo special use review, which had become
“more difficult over the years.”126 The district court held that this witness’s
opinion was sufficient evidence of an unreasonable limitation on religious exercise,
despite the same witness’s admission that special use review had become “more
difficult” for all land users, religious or secular.127 The court also disregarded
evidence that Boulder had conditionally approved the applications of every one of
the forty-five other religious institutions that had applied for zoning permits under
the special use review process.128
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of RMCC on
the basis of the unreasonable limitation and equal terms prongs of RLUIPA.129 On
the unreasonable limitation claim, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the evidence of
Boulder approving other churches’ permit applications, but held that the “jury
could choose to weigh evidence of the County’s land use regulation effectively
excluding churches more heavily than the County’s record of approving special use
applications.”130 On the equal terms claim, the Tenth Circuit held that “[a]lthough
the two proposed expansions were not identical, the many substantial similarities
allow for a reasonable jury to conclude” that the church and school were similarly
situated.131 The court declined to review the sufficiency of the evidence on the
church’s substantial burden claim, and thus expressed no opinion on the District
Court’s analysis of substantial burden or its rejection of environmental interests as
compelling interests.132
122. Rocky Mountain I, 612 F. Supp. at 1168-70.
123. The school had sought a permit to expand from 136,000 square feet to 196,000 square feet,
which the court held was comparable to the church’s proposed increase from 116,000 to 240,800 square
feet. Id. at 1164; Rocky Mountain II, 613 F.3d 1229, 1236 (10th Cir. 2010).
124. Rocky Mountain I, 612 F. Supp. at 1169-70.
125. Id. at 1177.
126. Id. at 1176-77.
127. Id. at 1177.
128. Boulder Appellate Brief, supra note 3, at 11.
129. Rocky Mountain II, 613 F.3d 1229, 1237-39 (10th Cir. 2010).
130. Id. at 1239.
131. Id. at 1236-37.
132. Id. at 1239. In January 2011, the Supreme Court denied the certiorari petition of Boulder
County. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’r of Boulder Cnty. v. Rocky Mountain Christian Church, 131 S. Ct. 978
(2011).
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V. PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT UNDER THE SHADOW OF RLUIPA
By holding that Boulder’s neutral and long-standing environmental zoning
laws violated RLUIPA, Rocky Mountain I and II have troubling implications for
any local government seeking to protect the environment through land use laws.
This section considers several approaches for reducing the threat RLUIPA poses to
the environment, starting with a potential repeal or amendment of RLUIPA. If
RLUIPA cannot be repealed or amended, the question then becomes how local
governments can apply zoning laws to protect the environment without running
afoul of the Act. The article suggests that courts should not follow the precedent
set by the Rocky Mountain decisions, and instead should more narrowly interpret
the equal terms and substantial burden prongs of RLUIPA. The article concludes
by suggesting that RLUIPA creates a false conflict between religion and the
environment, when what is needed is recognition of the parties’ common interests
in protecting the planet for future generations.
A. Repealing RLUIPA
RLUIPA’s supporters argue that in the land use context, a municipality can
always point to a non-discriminatory reason for denying a zoning request, such as
traffic or noise;133 thus, the Act is a necessary and constitutional response to protect
religious land users from discrimination.134 Opponents contend that while
preventing discrimination is an appropriate legislative goal, RLUIPA gives
churches rights that are beyond what is constitutionally permissible.135 While
RLUIPA’s prisoner provisions were upheld by the Supreme Court in Cutter v.
Wilkinson,136 the constitutionality of the land use provisions remains an open
question. No lower courts have found the provisions to be unconstitutional since
Cutter, but numerous local governments and scholars argue that RLUIPA’s land
use provisions are an unconstitutional violation of federalism principles, as well as
a violation of the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses.137
133. Joint Statement, supra note 51, at 7774-75.
134. See id. The need for RLUIPA has been colorfully described by some of its supporters. See,
e.g., Kevin M. Powers, Note, The Sword and the Shield: RLUIPA and the New Battle Ground of
Religious Freedom, 22 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 156 (2004) (“By utilizing RLUIPA in a claim, a
religious institution can wield the Sword of Damocles over an authority.”).
135. See, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 11, at 78-110.
136. 544 U.S. 709, 719-20 (2005) (holding that RLUIPA’s prisoner provisions fall into the “joint”
between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause and are thus a permissible
accommodation of religion, even if they provide more protections for religious exercise than the
constitution requires).
137. For a detailed analysis of the federalism arguments against RLUIPA, see Adams, supra note 49
(arguing that Congress exceeded its powers in enacting RLUIPA since it is not valid under any of the
jurisdictional bases it was enacted under—i.e., the Spending and Commerce Clauses and Section 5 of
the 14th Amendment). See also Hamilton, supra note 12; Cutter, 544 U.S. at 727 n.2 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“RLUIPA . . . may well exceed Congress’ authority under either the Spending Clause or
the Commerce Clause . . . . The Court, however, properly declines to reach those issues, since they are
outside of the question presented . . . .” ). While lower courts have repeatedly upheld the substantial
burden prong of RLUIPA as within Congress’s remedial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment because of the evidence of “widespread discrimination” against religious entities alleged
during Congressional hearings, the quality of the statistical evidence for that claim is questionable. See
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A larger debate about the meaning of Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
principles lies behind the question of the constitutionality of RLUIPA’s land use
provisions.138 While a detailed analysis of this debate is beyond the scope of this
article, if RLUIPA is found unconstitutional and repealed in its entirety, the threat
it poses to environmental laws would be eliminated. However, if RLUIPA were
repealed, churches would be left without a statutory means to challenge zoning
laws used to discriminate against them.139 Yet RLUIPA’s efficacy in allowing
churches to obtain redress for the rare cases of religious discrimination must be
balanced against the myriad of unintended consequences that RLUIPA in its
present form creates. Even if RLUIPA’s land use provisions are ultimately held
constitutional, the Act can still be criticized as bad public policy. Thus, several
amendments to RLUIPA have been proposed to address its most egregious
Adams, supra note 49, at 2397-400. Subsequent studies have indicated that religious land users receive
equal, or even more favorable, treatment than other land users. See Stephen Clowney, Comment, An
Empirical Look at Churches in the Zoning Process, 116 YALE L.J. 859, 863-64 (2007); Mark Chaves &
William Tsitsos, Are Congregations Constrained by Government? Empirical Results from the National
Congregations Study, 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 335 (2000). If there is in fact no pervasive discrimination
against religious entities, RLUIPA’s land use provisions would be unconstitutionally “out of proportion
to a supposed remedial or preventive object” and not “responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior.” See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (finding RFRA
unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
138. See Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After Boerne,
68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 913-14 (2000) (“The debate since Smith reflects two distinct answers to
that question. The first, which is shared by most proponents of the RLUIPA, holds that the Free
Exercise Clause promotes the full flourishing of religious conviction . . . only limit[ed] where necessary
to safeguard public concerns of the highest level, such as health and safety. Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Smith represents the second answer. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from placing
burdens on individuals because of their religious beliefs, but does not require the government to promote
religious flourishing by refraining from acting simply because it might burden religion.”) (citations
omitted). Thus, RLUIPA provides inconsistent protections to the same land use, depending on whether
it is operated by a religious entity or not. Adam J. MacLeod, A Non-Fatal Collision: Interpreting
RLUIPA Where Religious Land Uses and Community Interests Meet, 42 URB. LAW. 41, 73 (2010). For
example, the Act would extend protection to a religious homeless shelter built in violation of a zoning
code, but not to a secular homeless shelter. Id. Yet, “[i]t is not immediately obvious why a religious
homeless shelter should enjoy an exemption from land use regulations that a comparable shelter,
operated by a secular organization, does not enjoy.” Id. RLUIPA supporters contend that RLUIPA’s
elevation of religious land users is permissible because “certain rights are deliberately intended to give
leverage that no one else has. These are enshrined in the Bill of Rights.” Powers, supra note 134, at
195. However, it is difficult to understand why only some rights in the Bill of Rights are given special
attention and not others; for example, both free speech and religion are protected under the First
Amendment, but only a church, not a bookstore, can take advantage of the potential exemption provided
by RLUIPA from generally applicable zoning laws. See MacLeod, supra, at 90.
139. See Angela C. Carmella, RLUIPA: Linking Religion, Land Use, Ownership and the Common
Good, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 485, 487-88 (2009) (explaining that RLUIPA provides a statutory cause of
action in religious land use cases and augments pre-existing constitutional causes of action). Even one
of RLUIPA’s most vocal detractors, Marci Hamilton, has acknowledged that RLUIPA could, in rare
instances—in particular, in the case of the Ground Zero mosque—protect a religious land user from
zoning regulations being used as a pretext for underlying discrimination against the religious group. See
Marci Hamilton, The Wrong-Headed Furor Over the Planned Mosque at Ground Zero: Mistaking a
War on Radical Islamicism for a War on all Muslims, FINDLAW (August 5, 2010),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20100805.html. However, religious land users would not be left
without a remedy even if RLUIPA were repealed or found unconstitutional: Free Exercise or Equal
Protection challenges could still be raised against allegedly discriminatory zoning laws.

228

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

unintended consequences but still allow for it to be used by churches that face
actual discrimination, rather than mere inconvenience.
B. Amending RLUIPA
By giving churches advantages that no other land users enjoy, as well as
providing them with economic and legal incentives to intimidate local
governments, RLUIPA has given churches a sword where a shield was intended.140
Even RLUIPA supporters acknowledge that the Act is a “big stick”141 that allows
churches to “bully” local governments.142
Municipalities face significant pressure to settle when confronted by a
RLUIPA lawsuit, regardless of actual liability, because of the unbalanced financial
incentives inherent in RLUIPA. A religious claimant is entitled to attorneys’ fees if
it prevails on its claim under RLUIPA; however, there is no corresponding
provision entitling a local government to attorneys’ fees if it prevails.143 Attorneys’
fees are available to a church even if it only has partial success on the merits144 and
even if it is not awarded damages. Thus, although the jury refused to award RMCC
the $8 million it sought in damages from Boulder, Boulder was ultimately forced to
pay RMCC over $1.5 million in attorneys’ fees.145
140. The sword/shield analogy is not original to the author. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Our Towns;
Court Elbows Village in Favor of Religious Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2007, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9800E6DB143BF932A15753C1A9619C8B63; Powers,
supra note 134, at 156 (praising RLUIPA as a “Sword of Damocles”).
141. Wendie L. Kellington, RLUIPA Practice Pointers—Representing the Religious Claimant,
SN005 ALI-ABA 1141, 1148 (2007).
142. Elizabeth Reilly, Empathy and Pragmatism in the Choice of Constitutional Norms for Religious
Land Use Disputes, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 555, 560 (2009).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (“[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of . . . the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”).
RLUIPA’s language and legislative history indicate only prevailing plaintiffs are intended the benefit of
potential attorneys fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (2006) (“A person may assert a violation of this
Act as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”);
146 CONG. REC. E1563 (daily ed. September 22, 2000) (explaining that section 4(b) of Senate Bill 2869
(the senate bill which became 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc) “provides that a successful plaintiff may recover
attorneys’ fees.”). Thus, if a religious entity succeeds on a RLUIPA claim, the government defendant
must pay both its legal fees and the religious entity’s fees; if the local government succeeds, it still must
pay its own legal fees. In addition, because churches are often represented in RLUIPA lawsuits by
public interest law firms such as The Becket Fund or the Pacific Justice Institute, churches may not have
to pay their own attorneys’ fees even if they lose.
144. See DiLaura v. Twp. Of Ann Arbor, 471 F.3d 666, 670 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a
plaintiff is a prevailing party for purposes of RLUIPA if it has “succeeded on ‘any significant issue in
litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit’”) (quoting Tex. State
Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 789 (1989)).
145. Boulder Appellate Brief, supra note 3, at 15 (noting that no damages were awarded by the jury
at the trial); Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’r of Boulder Cnty., No. 06-cv00554, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8273, at *21 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2010) (awarding RMCC approximately
$1.35 million in attorneys’ fees and expenses for costs incurred in its lawsuit against Boulder); Rocky
Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’r of Boulder Cnty., No. 06-cv-00554, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 102081, at * 21 (D. Colo. Sept. 13, 2010) (awarding RMCC an additional $217,000 in attorney
fees and expenses for costs incurred in the Tenth Circuit appeal). Attorneys’ fees in RLUIPA lawsuits
can be exorbitant because churches may employ the services of nationally-known First Amendment
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Furthermore, RLUIPA authorizes the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to bring
suit against local governments, either on its own initiative or as an amicus to a
church’s lawsuit.146 The DOJ has created the “First Freedom Project” to promote
and publicize its efforts; as of September 2010, the DOJ has opened fifty-one
RLUIPA investigations, filed seven independent RLUIPA lawsuits and ten amicus
briefs in churches’ lawsuits, and intervened in thirty additional lawsuits to defend
RLUIPA’s constitutionality.147 Thus, local governments must contend not only
with the costs associated with a church’s underlying lawsuit, but also with the costs
of responding to a potential DOJ lawsuit. As a result, local governments often
choose to settle, even where ultimate liability under RLUIPA is unclear.148
Amending RLUIPA would potentially refocus the Act on its intended purpose
of eliminating religious discrimination. One possible amendment would be to
narrow the definition of “religious exercise.” As discussed above in Section III,
when a RLUIPA plaintiff characterizes something that it wants and that it is
prevented from doing by zoning laws as part of its religious exercise, courts must
accept the church’s definition of its religious beliefs.149 As a result, almost any
church activity falls under the jurisdiction of RLUIPA. Yet, while RLUIPA’s
definition of religious exercise may be overly-expansive, it is the lesser of two
evils: adopting any other definition would put courts in the business of determining
what is and is not “religion.”150
Another potential amendment to RLUIPA would be a blanket exemption for
environmental zoning laws. However, seemingly neutral, generally applicable
environmental zoning laws—like any other law—can serve as a cloak for
discrimination.151 Simply exempting environmental zoning laws from RLUIPA on
litigators whose rates exceed average rates in the local community; for example, Williams & Connolly
partner Kevin Baine represented RMCC on its appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Id. at *8-9.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(f) (2006).
147. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE
AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSON ACT (September 2010), http://www.justice.gov/crt/rluipa_
report_092210.pdf.
148. See Adam Liptak, Justice Dept. Takes up a Little Church’s Zoning Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2004, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/04/us/justice-dept-takes-up-a-little-churchs-zoning-fight.html?scp=18&sq= (describing how “the Justice Department’s civil rights division . . .
weighed in, accusing Maui County of religious discrimination and threatening a lawsuit of its own,”
after Maui, Hawaii determined that under applicable zoning regulations, a small church was not
permitted to build in a rural area because it would create traffic and safety issues). Maui initially
perceived the DOJ’s action “as a betrayal of the Bush administration’s usual deference to local
governments . . . [and was] in no mood to capitulate” because it believed it had not violated RLUIPA by
routinely applying its zoning regulations to the church. Id. Maui capitulated a year later under the dual
threat of the church’s RLUIPA lawsuit and the DOJ suit, and settled with the church for a “substantial”
sum. Christie Wilson, Maui Pays Church to Settle Land Use Case, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Nov. 19,
2004, available at http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2004/Nov/19/ln/ln22p.html.
149. See supra Section III.
150. See, e.g., Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990)
(“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine
the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”).
151. See Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-cv-3217 (PGS), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73176 (D. N.J. Oct. 1, 2007). In Township of Wayne, a mosque purchased property shortly
before 9/11 that was zoned as environmentally sensitive. Id. at *2. The township attempted to purchase
the property from the mosque under an open space regulation authorizing the use of eminent domain to
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the assumption that the application of such laws is always motivated by “green”
goals would fail to acknowledge that just like other laws, environmental zoning
laws have the potential to be applied in a discriminatory manner.
RLUIPA could also be amended to reverse the order in which courts analyze
claims under the three prongs and change the standard of review applied at each
level.152 By requiring courts to focus on the most harmful government behavior
first—discrimination or total exclusion—the Act could refocus RLUIPA on the
wrongs it was intended to address.153 Only if no evidence is found to support that
prong would a court then consider whether the church has been treated on less than
equal terms than non-religious assemblies.154 Finally, only if no evidence under
either of the first two prongs is found would a court consider whether a substantial
burden has been imposed.155
However, any amendment to RLUIPA is unlikely in the current political
climate. RLUIPA is an easy law for Congress to stand behind: as a 30-second
sound bite, the Act is anti-discrimination, pro-religion. Any amendment would be
labeled as anti-religion, a charge no member of Congress wants to face, considering
RLUIPA’s wide base of support, from Evangelicals in Texas suburbs to Hasidic
communities in New York City.156 Since an amendment to RLUIPA is unlikely,
courts are left with the task of interpreting RLUIPA in a way that does not
undermine environmental protection.
C. Treating Religious Assemblies on Less than Equal Terms
Unlike even the most stringent test under constitutional equal protection
analysis, RLUIPA’s equal terms provision imposes strict liability: once two entities
are determined to be “similarly situated,” a local government is not permitted to
offer any justifications for differing treatment.157 To ensure that the Act’s equal
terms prong does not eviscerate environmental protection laws, courts should not
only continue to read a similarly situated requirement into the Act, but should also
take into account changed circumstances that may justify a local government

purchase environmentally sensitive properties. Id. at *4-6. The mosque alleged that the township’s
actions violated RLUIPA, and a district court held that it was at least a question for a jury and rejected
the township’s motion for summary judgment, citing evidence that the mosque was the only one out of
100 environmentally sensitive properties in the community that the township attempted to purchase. Id.
at *10-11, *18. The case never went to trial and was settled out of court. See TOWN OF WAYNE 2009
STATE OF THE TOWNSHIP ADDRESS, available at http://www.waynetownship.com/flyers/
2009stateofthetown.pdf (last visited on Oct. 5, 2011).
152. See Reilly, supra note 142, at 584-87 (suggesting that such a reversal “would address and
protect the most invidious harms first.”). Reilly also suggests that strict scrutiny be imposed to the
discrimination prong, intermediate scrutiny to the equal terms prong, and rational basis/Smith standard
to the substantial burden prong. Id. at 589-92.
153. Id. at 590.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 590-91.
156. See RLPA Hearings, supra note 17 (collecting testimony in favor of RLPA from religious
leaders of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, the First
Baptist Church of Georgetown, the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, the Baptist Joint
Committee on Public Affairs, the Christian Legal Society, and the National Council of Churches).
157. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 269 (3d Cir. 2007).
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treating a religious entity differently than a non-religious assembly.
The greatest threat to the environment today is the slow encroachment on
habitat and degradation of natural resources caused by seemingly limitless human
development.158 In Rocky Mountain, nine years had passed between when Boulder
had granted an expansion permit to a private school and when it denied a permit to
RMCC.159 While the school and the church were similar to the extent that they
were located in the same rural zone and sought comparably large expansions, the
two entities may have differed significantly in how their expansions would affect
the environment.160 Development that might have been appropriate a decade
earlier may have no longer been appropriate in light of new environmental
considerations, such as diminished available habitat or incremental impacts on
groundwater. As Boulder argued in its brief to the Tenth Circuit, “[l]ocal
governments cannot secure open space if they can never draw a reasonable line
regarding intense and large expansions of pre-existing uses.”161 Once local
governments draw such a line, no land user—religious or secular—should be
permitted to cross it.162
D. Limiting Limitless Expansion
Churches “ideally would have an unlimited and ever-expanding place of
worship with open doors and a parking space for all who would enter.”163 Indeed,
for many churches, a growing congregation is part of their religious beliefs; some
congregations also believe that they must worship together as one body.164 As
discussed in Section II, when a church claims that its expansion or need to worship
as one body is “part of God’s plan,”165 courts must accept the church’s definition of
its religious belief.166
Yet few would argue that RLUIPA protects an “absolute right to assemble for
worship wherever, and under whatever circumstances, a religious group happens to

158. DUERKSEN & SNYDER, supra note 4, at 2.
159. Rocky Mountain II, 613 F.3d 1229, 1236 (10th Cir. 2010).
160. The record does not indicate if there were such changed circumstances that put increased
pressure on the local ecosystems. Boulder offered a general argument that approving RMCC’s
expansion would be inconsistent with its policy of protecting rural lands that have “significant
environmental, scenic or cultural value” and conserving agricultural lands. See Boulder Appellate Brief,
supra note 3, at 9-11.
161. Id. at 29.
162. Under the 10th Circuit’s interpretation of the equal terms prong, if a local government
anticipates needing to draw such a line, it must do so before a religious entity attempts to cross it, i.e.,
the first applicant required to comply with an environmental zoning law cannot be a religious entity.
163. Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, No. SA-01-CA-1149-RF, 2004 WL
546792, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004).
164. See, e.g., Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203,
1212 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Because the church is one body, it is essential to our faith that the whole church
body regularly assemble together as a body to worship God . . . .”).
165. Weiss & Lowell, supra note 27, at 324.
166. See supra Section III (discussing First Amendment jurisprudence limiting courts’ ability to
question claimed religious beliefs).
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prefer.”167 The results of such an expansive right of religious exercise on the
environment, as well as on other safety, health, and welfare concerns, would be
unjustifiable. As the Supreme Court explained in Employment Division v. Smith:
“[T]o make an individual’s obligation to obey . . . a law contingent upon the law’s
coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is
‘compelling’ - permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto
himself,’ - contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.”168
Yet, because of the low threshold that some courts have set for what suffices as
a “substantial” burden, RLUIPA comes dangerously close to allowing religious
entities to become a “law unto [themselves].”169 The court in Rocky Mountain I
failed to recognize the slippery slope created if a substantial burden is defined as
any zoning regulation that limits expansion. While the conditions RMCC has faced
in its current facility may not have been ideal, it is difficult to understand how they
could be characterized as “rendering religious exercise . . . effectively
impracticable.”170 By holding that Boulder’s rural zoning restriction imposed a
substantial burden,171 the court in Rocky Mountain I essentially gave RMCC a
“blank check” to expand as it sees fit.172
167. MacLeod, supra note 138, at 77 (“[RLUIPA] does not create an absolute right to assemble.
However, it does make it difficult for local governing authorities to require religious landowners to
internalize many of the negative externalities that they generate.”).
168. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (internal citations omitted).
169. As discussed infra Section V.E. few interests are considered compelling, and environmental
protection has not been definitely accepted as one. See also Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of
Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Unless the requirement of a substantial burden is taken
seriously, the difficulty of proving a compelling governmental interest will free religious organizations
from zoning restrictions of any kind.”).
170. CLUB, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003). The Tenth Circuit has not articulated a specific
definition of substantial burden, holding only that RLUIPA “is not intended to be given any broader
interpretation than the Supreme Court’s articulation of the concept of substantial burden.” Grace United
Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 661 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing CLUB, 342 F.3d at
760-61). The cited portion of CLUB defines substantial burden as a land use regulation that “necessarily
bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise . . . effectively
impracticable.” CLUB, 342 F.3d at 761. However, the Tenth Circuit has also approved, in part, a lower
court’s broader definition of substantial burden:
A government regulation “substantially burdens” the exercise of religion if the
regulation: (1) significantly inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests
some tenet of the institutions belief; (2) meaningfully curtails an institution’s ability to
express adherence to its faith; or (3) denies an institution reasonable opportunities to
engage in those activities that are fundamental to the institution’s religion.
Grace United Methodist Church, 451 F.3d at 660 n.4, 663 (holding that the above jury instruction on the
meaning of substantial burden was acceptable except that it erroneously required that the activity
burdened be one that is “fundamental” to the religion).
171. Rocky Mountain I, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1176 (D.Colo. 2009). See also Cottonwood Christian
Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1226-27 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that a
zoning law that prevented a 4000-member megachurch from building a facility large enough for its
expanding membership substantially burdened the church’s religious exercise and that the church could
expand in its chosen location without regard to the zoning law). Megachurches are not the only type of
religious entities who have claimed that zoning laws limiting their expansion are a substantial burden.
See, e.g., Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 424 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319-22 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that
where a church did not have space for offices for religious education or parish council meetings and was
denied a permit to expand because the applicable code capped the size of buildings in the residential
zone the church was located in, a substantial burden had been imposed). However, because of their size,
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Giving churches such a near-absolute right to expand can undermine a wide
range of environmental protection goals, ranging from water quality to habitat
protection to erosion control. Unlike the district court in Rocky Mountain, several
other courts require that a substantial burden be something more than a church “not
[getting] everything that it wants.”173 For example, several courts have held that
as long as reasonable alternative properties are available within the jurisdiction for
a church’s use, zoning restrictions that limit growth on its current property are not a
substantial burden.174 While “these alternatives may be less appealing or more
costly, neither the RLUIPA nor the Constitution requires [the local government] to
subsidize the real estate market.”175 The Seventh Circuit has gone further, holding
that even if there are no alternative properties available in a jurisdiction, a zoning
law that limits the church’s growth may still not be substantial;176 the court
explained that RLUIPA does not require that churches be shielded from “[t]he
harsh reality of the marketplace [that] sometimes dictates that certain facilities are
not available to those who desire them.”177
Other courts have defined substantial burden in a temporal manner, rejecting
claims based on hypothetical future growth. For example, in Living Water Church
of God v. Township of Meridian, the Sixth Circuit held that a zoning law setting a
maximum square footage for buildings in the zone a church was located in was not
megachurches provide the starkest example of how environmental protection efforts are threatened
when religious entities claim that zoning laws limiting their ability to expand are a substantial burden.
172. But see Trinity Assembly of God v. People’s Counsel, 962 A.2d 404, 430 (Md. 2008) (rejecting
the church members argument that they should be allowed practice their religion “as they see fit.”).
173. Timberline Baptist Church v. Washington Cnty., 154 P.3d. 759, 774 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
174. See, e.g., San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004).
In San Jose, a Christian college owned property in a planned unit development, in which no nonhospital uses (secular or religious) were permitted. Id. at 1027. It sought rezoning but the city denied
the application, on the grounds that the city needed a hospital on the property. Id. at 1029. The court
reasoned that the college could sell its property and purchase another property in which school use was
allowed, and that this was not a substantial burden, even if it was inconvenient, time-consuming, and
more expensive than building on its current property. See also Timberline Baptist Church, 154 P.3d. at
774-5 (holding that since there were several available properties without the development restrictions of
the zone where the church had purchased its property, the burden imposed on the church by the zoning
restrictions was not substantial).
175. Episcopal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 691, 705 (E.D. Mich. 2004)
(internal quotations omitted). See also Calvary Temple Assembly of God v. City of Marinette, No. 06c-1148, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 55500, *3-5, *24, *27-30, *30 (E.D. Wis. Jul. 18, 2008) (holding that
where there were alternate sites in the city for a church’s expansion, zoning code restrictions that limited
parking and building square footage on the church’s current site were not a substantial burden, even
though acquiring the alternate sites might be expensive and less convenient than expanding at the
desired site); Hillcrest Christian Sch. v. City of Los Angeles, No. 05-08788 RGK(RCx), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 95925, at *15 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2007) (holding that the city “has not denied Hillcrest the
opportunity to expand, nor to continue its religious exercise. Rather the City has denied Hillcrest’s
ability to expand its school in a single location. Hillcrest’s land use travails demonstrate unfortunate but
familiar pitfalls of this county’s localized land use planning system. . . . but . . . do not amount to a
violation of law.”).
176. CLUB, 342 F.3d, 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003).
177. Id. (quoting Love Church v. City of Evanston, 896 F.2d 1082, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990). See also
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 n.11 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that
there was no substantial burden, but finding that the city was liable for violation of the equal terms
provision of RLUIPA).
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a substantial burden.178 The court rejected the church’s arguments that if its
congregation continued to expand, there would come a point in the next decade
when the church’s facility would need to exceed the maximum square footage.179
The court explained that “[t]he question before us here is whether the Township’s
denial substantially burdens Living Water’s religious exercise now—not five, ten
or twenty years from now.”180
Finally, some courts have considered whether a church’s own actions and
decisions—such as not efficiently using their current property181 or choosing to
purchase a property located in an area with zoning restrictions because it was
cheaper than property in areas without zoning restrictions182—have put the church
in the position of using RLUIPA to seek an exemption from generally applicable
zoning laws. For example, in Timberline Baptist Church v. Washington County, an
Oregon church challenged a rural zoning regulation that limited the scale of
development on its property, a law similar to the challenged zoning regulation in
Rocky Mountain.183 Unlike the court in Rocky Mountain I, the Timberline court
rejected the church’s substantial burden claim.184 Rather than focusing on the
overcrowded conditions at the church’s current location and the difficulties that
would result if the zoning code were applied to prevent it from building a larger
facility, the court focused on the alternatives available to the church to
accommodate its growing membership, such as selling its rural property and
purchasing available property in an area where the type of development it sought
was permitted.185
The Timberline court also noted that the church had put itself in the position it
was in: as a rational buyer in the marketplace, the church had chosen to purchase
the agricultural property, fully aware of the applicable zoning limitations, rather
than purchase other available properties with no such limitations, because those
properties were more expensive.186 The Timberline decision thus implicitly
recognized that development limitations on rural properties are often intended to
protect environmentally sensitive land, and churches should not be permitted to use
RLUIPA to obtain the benefit of such land–cheaper property–without the burden–
zoning restrictions.

178. 258 F.Appx. 729, 738-39 (6th Cir. 2007).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 738.
181. See, e.g., Episcopal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 691, 708 (E.D. Mich.
2004) (holding that overcrowding at a religious entity’s existing facility was insufficient to establish a
substantial burden because the religious entity was not entitled to expand at will at its current location in
violation of the zoning code when the evidence indicated it could use its own facility more efficiently).
182. See, e.g., Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 615 F. Supp. 2d 980, 991
(D. Ariz. 2009); Greater Bible Way of Jackson v. City of Jackson, 733 N.W.2d 734, 750 (Mich. 2007);
Timberline Baptist Church v. Washington Cnty., 154 P.3d. 759, 771 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
183. Timberline Baptist Church, 154 P.3d at 760-61.
184. Id. at 771.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 760. Because less development is permitted on open space rural and agricultural land, it is
often priced lower than comparable urban or suburban property. But there is a tradeoff: the larger,
cheaper, rural property is typically located away from population centers and accompanied by
restrictions on development so as to protect environmentally sensitive rural land.
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E. Environmental Protection as a Compelling Interest
As long as courts continue to expansively define substantial burden, as the
court in Rocky Mountain I did, it is imperative that environmental protection be
recognized as a compelling government interest. Despite the court’s opinion
in Rocky Mountain I to the contrary, few interests can be considered more
compelling than the protection of the environment.
While individual
environmental zoning laws may have a relatively limited impact—preventing
erosion to a few miles of hillside, or limiting pollution in one river or stream—
without such specific, targeted laws to protect the environment, overall protection
would be impossible.187
Environmental protection has been found to be a legitimate or important
interest in a myriad of non-RLUIPA cases challenging environmental zoning laws,
but no court–other than the court in Rocky Mountain I188–has definitively addressed
whether environmental protection would be considered a compelling interest under
RLUIPA.189 However, in a decision analyzing religious interests and governmental
environmental protection goals under another federal statute dealing with religious
freedom, the Eighth Circuit held that preserving environmental resources is a
compelling government interest.190 In Crow v. Gullet, a group of Native
Americans sued the state of South Dakota, alleging that regulations limiting the use
of a state park that was also a sacred prayer area in the Native American religion
were a violation of the group’s religious freedom under the First Amendment and
the American Indian Religious Freedoms Act.191 One of the justifications offered
by the state for the regulations was the need to limit the number of visitors to the
park so as to preserve the natural resources and habitat from decay and erosion.192
The Eighth Circuit held that the government’s interest in protecting the
environment was a compelling state interest and, therefore, there was no violation
of the Native American group’s free exercise rights.193 While the Crow decision
may be questionable in terms of its protection for Native American religious
rights,194 its recognition of environmental protection as a compelling interest is
precedent that courts addressing RLUIPA claims should look to.

187. Tarlock, supra note 40, at 661 (explaining that local environmental zoning laws are often the
“only realistic choice” for environmental protection).
188. See discussion supra Section IV. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision on other grounds and
did not express any opinion on this part of the district court’s opinion. See supra Section IV.
189. The court in Albanian Associated. Fund v. Twp. of Wayne recognized the potential question of
whether environmental protection is a compelling interest, but declined to address the question until the
matter went to trial. No. 06-cv-3217(PGS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73176, at *43-44 (D. N.J. Oct. 1,
2007). The case was settled before trial, so the question was never definitively addressed. See supra
note 151 and accompanying text.
190. Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 1983).
191. Id. at 857-58.
192. Id. at 858.
193. Although Crow was a pre-RLUIPA case, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs in that case would have
any more success under RLUIPA, because a RLUIPA plaintiff must have a property interest in land. Id.
194. See supra note 62 (noting RLUIPA’s and RFRA’s ironic lack of protection for Native American
religious rights).
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F. Conclusion
“Religion is like a knife: you can either use it to cut bread, or stick in
someone’s back.” ~ Desmond Tutu
The conflict created by RLUIPA between religion and the environment stems
in part from a difference in perceived values.195 As a leader of RMCC explained
while discussing the church’s lawsuit, “[Boulder] define[s] the greater good in a far
different way than we do.”196 For religious entities, using their land in a manner
they see as mandated by God trumps any environmental considerations. For local
governments, charged with protecting the public welfare, preserving natural
resources and ecosystems for future generations trumps any physical building
requirements that a religious group may have.
Despite statements from Congress that RLUIPA was intended to prevent
discrimination and not provide “a free pass” elevating religious land use above
everything else,197 overly-expansive interpretations of RLUIPA, like those in Rocky
Mountain I and II, lead to the conclusion that “that is exactly what the law set forth
to do.”198 This elevation of religion above all values is congruent with the belief of
RLUIPA supporters that “[the United States] was founded as a country in which
belief in deity trumps secular government interests.”199 Yet this point of view is
not only constitutionally untenable—it was rejected by the Supreme Court in Smith
and again in City of Boerne—it also fails to take into account that while religion is
undoubtedly an important value in American society, it is not the only important
value.200
One of the most compelling values that must also be considered is the
preservation of the planet for future generations. As a means of furthering this
value,201 environmental zoning laws are not actually in conflict with the values of
many religious groups. Thus, numerous religious groups have “added a moral
voice to debates” on environmental policy issues and “linked projects for social
justice, health and ecological well-being” to tenets of their faith.202 While a
195. See Andrew M. Englander, Note, God and Land in the Garden State: The Impact of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act in New Jersey, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 753, 789-90
(2009) (noting that opinions on whether legislation as “sweeping” as RLUIPA is really needed to
address the potential problem of discrimination against religious land users “may ultimately be a value
judgment, not a legal judgment.”).
196. Laura Snider, Boulder County will ask U.S. Supreme Court to consider Rocky Mountain
Christian Church case, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Sept. 30, 2010, available at
http://www.dailycamera.com/ news/ci_16212241.
197. Joint Statement, supra note 51, at 7776.
198. Laugensen, supra note 1.
199. Id.
200. See Henriques, supra note 5 (“Precious as protecting religious freedom is, however, there are
cases where . . . [it] collide[s] with other values important in this country—like extending the
protections of government to all citizens and sharing the responsibilities of society fairly.”).
201. When local governments enact environmental zoning laws pursuant to the police power, the
goal is to protect the public, which “includes all citizens including generations not yet born.” Merriam,
supra note 35.
202. Statements and Activities, NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTNERSHIP FOR THE ENVIRONMENT,
http://www.nrpe.org/statements-activities (last visited Jan. 1, 2012). The National Religious Partnership
for the Environment (“NRPE”) is a lobbying organization formed in the 1990’s made up of leaders of
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discussion of the theological arguments in support of environmental protection is
beyond the scope of this article, there is a growing recognition among religious
groups that environmentalism is compatible or even required by their faith.203
Allowing one category of land users to systematically undermine
environmental laws is not an appropriate way to address concerns about religious
discrimination. In the vast majority of cases, churches face difficulties in the
zoning process not because of discrimination, but for the same reason as any other
land user: the “increasing pressures on society’s remaining undeveloped lands.”204
Environmental zoning laws are one of the most effective tools available for
managing those pressures and ensuring that natural resources and ecosystems are
not incrementally destroyed. While the courts need to take the primary role by
narrowing the application of RLUIPA, religious entities and local governments
need to seek compromise on mutually acceptable solutions that recognize that their
ultimate goal is the same: to preserve and protect God’s green earth.

several faiths. History of the Partnership, NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTNERSHIP FOR THE ENVIRONMENT,
http://www.nrpe.org/what-is-national-religious-partnership-environment (last visited Jan. 1, 2012).
203. See, e.g., ROGER S. GOTTLIEB, A GREENER FAITH, RELIGIOUS ENVIRONMENTALISM AND OUR
PLANET’S FUTURE 9 (2006) (discussing religious environmentalism and how religion is becoming a
leading voice in the environmental movement). See also Stephen M. Johnson, Is Religion the
Environment’s Last Best Hope? Targeting Change in Individual Behavior Through Personal Norm
Activation, 24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 119, 122 (2009) (discussing how religion can play an effective role
in influencing individual behavior to achieve environmental protection); Staff Author, “Greens” and
Churches Join Hands in Environmental Mission, WALL ST. J., March 26, 2002, at A24 (discussing how
religious lobbying was a key in Senate votes against drilling in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge).
204. Julie M. Osborn, Note, RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions: Congress’ Unconstitutional Response
to City of Boerne, 28 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 155, 165 (2004). By pitting religious groups
against the environment, RLUIPA also fosters a hostile atmosphere and can perversely cause the very
religious animosity it was intended to remedy when others in the community perceive churches being
permitted to do what no other land users can do. Englander, supra note 195, at 755. See also
HAMILTON, supra note 11, at 84-85, 103 (discussing several RLUIPA cases “injecting
interdenominational hatred into a context where it otherwise did not exist”).

